Wednesday, 29 June 2016

82. Because you need educating. Poltical essay 2. Defining right - wing extreamism.

Following on from the last essay, this next essay's aim is to outline how UKIP, Farage and the majority of the Leave Campaigns rhetoric shares a lot of similarities with Paxton's five stages of Fascism.

This correlation would define them as 'far right.'


Critically evaluate the academic debate on the most appropriate way to define the concept of right-wing extremism.
In the past two decades there has been an increase in academic research regarding right-wing extremism. This influx of interest has undoubtedly been fueled by the "resurgence in electoral support for extreme-right political parties," (Husbands 1992: 267) during these decades. This academic interest is split amongst numerous topics; however all of this research is conducted under a conceptual framework; a working definition of what right-wing extremism is, and thus what criteria qualifies a party as one of the extreme-right. "In spite of the fact that right-wing extremism has been extensively analyzed by academics, journalists and other observers alike, it remains the case that an unequivocal definition of this concept is still lacking" (Carter 2005: 14). Carter points out that "almost every scholar of right-wing extremism has pointed to the difficulties associated with defining the concept" (Carter 2005: 14). This difficulty has resulted in a vast number of definitions and criteria of what constitutes a right-wing extremist party; Mudde found some 58 different features (Carter 2005: 15) in the various academic definitions of right wing extremism. Some stress the spatial dimension; that is parties on the furthest points on the right hand side of the political spectrum as a fundamental feature of right-wing extremism (Taggart 1995: 35), whilst others pointed towards attitudes towards the political system as the key factor (Taggart 1995: 37). While these detentions are accurate to some extent, there are inherent flaws with each one, indeed, a good deal of definitions are found wanting when attempts are made to correlate the definitions with existing right-wing extremist parties. It is therefore important to compare and critically analyse the debate around the definition of right-wing extremism and how these typologies stand up in practice.
In an attempt to overcome the difficulties of defining right wing-extremism, Ignazi argues that "on the one hand we need to identify some common feature of the parties we label 'extreme right'; on the other hand we need to trace a clear cut borderline between ERPs and their neighbours, the conservative/confessional/centrist liberal parties" (Ignazi 1992: 7) This idea of finding some common ground between the right-wing extremist parties is one that is echoed throughout the literature. The three criteria Ignazi proposes are; the spatial aspect; the historic-ideological and the attitudinal-systemic (Ignazi 1992: 7). While Ignazi acknowledges that the spatial aspect is limited, and thus alone cannot define a party as right-wing extremist, it is the foundation of his definition; selecting only the parties "located most to the right in each European country" (Ignazi 1992: 8). It is this list that the other criteria are applied to. Ignazi's theoretical framework, and its expectations are summed up as follows;

"parties more on right of the political spectrum are categorized according to the presence or absence of a fascist heritage and the acceptance or refusal of the political system. In order to be included in our class of 'extreme right' parties, the most right wing parties, should either fulfill the historical-ideological fascist criterion, or should exhibit a delegitimizing impact, through a series of issues, values, attitudes (rather than a structured and coherent ideology), which undermines system legitimacy. If a party fits the historic-ideological criterion as well as the systemic one, we can think of it as belonging to the 'old right' type. If a party is not linked to fascism but has an anti-system profile, we can think of it as belonging to the 'new right' type. The adoption of this framework helps us to settle on the borderline between ERPs and conservative parties. The different spatial location (the conservative parties are more to the center), the different ideology (conservatism belongs to another ideological class), the different attitudes towards the system (conservatives are supportive or engage in 'goal opposition,' but never endanger system legitimacy) clearly make the distinction between the two classes" (Ignazi 1992: 12-13).

On a theoretical level this framework has its merits; Simple classification of parties and a clear process of differentiating them from their conservative peers. However in practice this set of criteria is problematic. To begin with the spatial analysis of right-wing extremism is very basic, and lacking in a European context. To some extent Ignazi acknowledges this; "not all parties at the right-wing end of the left-right scale can properly be considered to be extreme right parties" (Ignazi 1992: 13). While a spatial analysis is useful for identifying right-wing parties, their 'extremist' nature is based upon the political environment they inhabit, hence his exclusion of parties from "Sweden, Ireland and Finland. While the Moderata Samlinspartei, Fianna Fail and the Kansallinen Kokoomus may be seen as the most right-wing parties of their respective countries they do not exhibit any antisystem attitudes (nor, a fortori, fascist tendencies)" (Ignazi 1992: 13). This spatial approach then has its flaws, however it does point out that there is an obvious need to focus solely on right-wing parties. This can be seen in aspects of his other criteria.
The ' historical-ideological fascist criterion' is also questionable to some extent. This historical link to fascism quite often correlates with countries where fascist regimes played a significant role; Italy, Germany, Spain and Austria being the most notable, which could play an obvious historically contextual role, however, in countries not tied so closely with fascist regimes it falls to the concept of attachment to a fascist ideology. Fascism in its own historical context is problematic, with historians debating over what exactly constitutes a fascist ideology, if it is at all. This can be seen clearly in vast differences between the style of rule in Nazi Germany and Mussolini's Italy (see Paxton (1998). 'The Five Stages of Fascism'). In this context, Ignazi's features 'common to all' fascisms could be seen as problematic. His definition of fascist ideology however correlates with other academic attempts to define the concept of right-wing extremism.
While it is possible to debate aspects of his criteria, Ignazi's typology "arguably displays the most theoretical and methodological rigour. The bases of division that are used are mutually exclusive and the typology is also exhaustive in nature" (Carter 2005: 27). Despite this, there are flaws with Ignazi's approach. Carter points out there are distinct differences between the parties within each of Ignazi's two groupings. "The fact that significant differences continue to exist between parties of the same group implies that, in Ignazi's typology, the diversity present within the extreme right party family is now illustrated as fully as it could have been had more bases of division been employed" (Carter 2005: 27).
This broadening of the bases of division is quite a significant concept. Amongst the literature there are countless examples of authors defining right-wing extremism on "the basis of a single feature. Husbands (1981), for example, considers xenophobia to be the characteristic feature of Western European right-wing extremism, while Hartmann et al. (1985: 9) use right-wing extremism as a collective term for all 'progress-hostile forces'" (Mudde 1995: 205). Mudde explains that limiting right-wing extremism to a single feature "leads to distorted and limited knowledge of the wide and complex phenomenon" (Mudde 1995: 206). In his attempt to define right-wing extremism Mudde focuses on the combination of its ideological features. By carrying out an extensive study of the available literature from various linguistic areas Mudde masses a list of features mentioned and picks out five that "were mentioned, in one form or another, by at least half of the authors; nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state," (Mudde 1995: 206) and then attempts to derive which of these features are necessary in a right-wing extremist party by using a mix of approaches. Again this approach has its merits; these five features, in some shape or form, feature in the majority of the literature; indeed most if not all can be seen in Ignazi's fascist and anti-system criteria. In the context of concept with no agreed upon definition this approach is clearly flawed. Carter points out the obvious by stating that "Just because these five features appear more frequently than others in the existing definitions of the concept of right-wing extremism does not mean that they can be considered as constituting to the foundations of a generally accepted definition..." (Carter 2005: 15). While Muddle's attempt of definition is a more broad approach it suffers from a similar problem to Ignazi's approach, and indeed, a large majority of the academic literature.
Carter's approach to defining what right wing-extremism is far more methodological and thorough than most attempts. Carter differs is in this approach is by breaking away from the spatial analysis and by diving right-wing extremism into its constitute parts; "To begin identifying the necessary features of right-wing extremism it is useful to go back to the concept of extremism..." (Carter 2005: 15). Political extremism then is where a party rejects the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state (carter 2005: 16). This is what makes right-wing extremists, extreme. The second part of breaking down this concept acknowledges that;

"anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements can part of a left-wing ideology just as they can be part of a right-wing ideology, political extremism can be left or right. Right-wing extremism is therefore ea particular type of political extremism, and is distinguishable from left-wing extremism. The distinction between the two types of extremism can be made by reference to attitudes towards the principle of fundamental human equality, a principle at the very core of liberal democracy. Whereas left-wing extremism accepts and supports this principle even thought it interprets it 'with consequences that mean the principle of total equality destroys the freedoms guaranteed by the rules and institutions of that the state of law....right-wing extremism strongly rejects it. Instead right-wing extremism emphasizes the notions of inequality of individuals, and 'extreme right-wing models of political and social order are rooted in a belief in the necessity of institutionalised social and political inequality" (Carter 2005: 16).

This is what makes right-wing extremism, right wing. These distinctions are fundamental to Carters theoretical framework, not only do they lay the foundations for what characterises right wing, and extremist parties, but it also lays the foundation for the argument of the difference between necessary features, and possible ones. Drawing on the academic literature, Carter argues that while the features often mentioned are important in understating right-wing extremist parties, the vast majority are only possible features. Building from Mudde's five features she states that "these five features do not occupy the same place on the conceptual ladder of abstraction...Put differently, nationalism, xenophobia, racism and a call for a strong state are all manifestations of the higher concept of anti-democratic sentiment" (Carter 2005: 15). This abstraction is an important, as it makes the distinction that while these features are possible of right-wing extremist parties, they and not mutually exclusive; in other words, not all right wing-extremist parties are racist. On the other hand all right-wing extremist parties are inherently anti-democratic, even if all anti-democratic parties are not necessarily right-wing extremist, and thus not sufficient enough define the concept alone (Carter 2005: 15).
Keeping this distinction in mind it is possible to identify the right wing extremist parties, and thus break them down into their constitute features. This is done along three bases of division based of the parties' attitudes towards the democratic system; "One group is made up of parties that reject outright the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state, and wish to see the democratic order replaced...A second group comprises of parties that...undermine the legitimacy of the existing constitutional state by calling for less democracy, weaker powers for parliament and less pluralism. Finally, a third group of parties also favour reform....but unlike the parties of the second group, demand less state intervention rather than more..." (Carter 2005: 41). Carter states the obvious advantages of his approach are not only satisfying the 'key theoretical and methodological conditions' but also as it is as up to date as possible it is sufficiently broad enough to represent the diversity within the party family (Carter 2005: 50). It is approach which gives us five types of right-wing extremist party; Neo-Nazi Parties, Neo Fascist parties, Authoritarian xenophobic parties, Neo-Liberal xenophobic parties and Neo-Liberal populist parties (Carter 2005: 51). The aforementioned advantages of this approach are understandable once each category in the typology has been fully explained. Not only does it incorporate the existing 'possible' features of right-wing extremism, but it also takes into account the diversity of the 'party family.' The main criticism of this Carter's approach is that the 'Neo-Liberal populist parties link to the necessary anti-democratic attitudes need to signify it as a right-wing extremist party. This is a criticism is one that is both acknowledged and countered; "...a number of existing studies do not consider some of the neo-liberal populist parties to belong to the wider extreme right party-family, precisely because they do not deem the anti-systemness of these parties to warrant their inclusion in this party family" (Carter 2005: 54). It is important to consider to what extent parties "de-emphasize their anti-systemness" (Ignazi 2006: 218). In his later work Ignazi points out that some parties never make a 'frontal attack on democracy' but still display 'substantial anti-partism' though the contempt help towards parties and politicians within their political environment (Ignazi 2003: 148). It is for this reason that Carter maintains that Neo-Liberal populist parties should remain in the right-wing extremist party family, albeit on the fringes, as they show sufficient anti-systemness to "undermine the legitimacy of the state" (Carter 2005: 54).
It is clear then that defining right-wing extremism is not a simple task. The classical spatial aspect; those parties on that are the furthest right on the political spectrum, is fundamentally flawed, in so far that is does not include all the parties that occupy that space. The single feature definitions are also flawed as they are too narrow and thus do not capture the wide variety of right-wing extremist parties. What emerges where these definition fails is the idea that right-wing extremist parties "have things in common (policies, perspectives, style) that enable observes to treat the subject matter as a political family...This is not to say that prospective members of the extreme right family (or other political families) have exactly the same, essential characteristics, but rather to suggest that there is enough in common to consider the phenomena in question as a collectivity or family..." (Hainsworth 2008: 23). What Carter then does is to put aside the 'possible features' that feature heavily in the academic text, and focus on the necessary aspects of right-wing extremism; what makes them right wing; the rejection of the fundamental principle of human equality and what makes them extremist; the rejection of the existing constitutional democratic system. Based on these principles it is possible to create a typology that both defines and categorises parties of the extreme right. This conceptual framework is important, as this "grouping of political parties and movements...needs exploring and explaining, especially since they have won significant levels of support and impacted....upon socio-political like and policy making" (Hainsworth 2008: 23) within Western Europe. Whether or not these categorisations and their predictions match with electoral success is an entirely different problem.


Bibliography.
• Carter, Elisabeth (2005). The Extreme Right in Western Europe: Success or Failure? Manchester: Manchester University Press.
• Hainsworth, Paul (2008). The Right in Western Europe, Abingdon: Routledge.
• Husband, Christopher T (1992). 'The Other Face of 1992: The Extreme-Right Explosion in Western Europe,' Parliamentary Affairs, 45:3, 267-84.
• Ignazi, Perio (1992). 'The Silent Counter-Revolution: Hypotheses on the Emergence of Extreme Right Wing Parties in Europe,' European Journal of Political Research, 22:1, 3-34.
• Ignazi, Perio (2003). Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Ignazi, Perio (2006). Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Mudde, Cas (1995), 'Right Wing Extremism Analyzed: A Comparative Analysis of the Ideologies of Three Alleged Right-Wing Extremist Parties (NPD, NDP, CP'86'),' European Journal of Political research, 27:2, 203-24.
• Paxton, Robert (1998). 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' Journal of Modern History, Vol. 70, No. 1. (March., University of Chicago).
• Taggart, Paul (1995). 'New Populist Parties in western Europe,' West European Politics, 18:1, 34-51.



Monday, 27 June 2016

81. Because you need educating. Political Essay 1 - Five Stages of Fascism.

So 'Great' Britain voted to leave the Eu in a referendum on Thursday 23/06/2106.
A day that will live on history...

Simply put, this referendum was won by people who didn't know what they were voting for, and in all likelihood, still don't.
The ramifications of this will last for decades.

So I decided it was about time to educate you guys.

Our first essay is about Fascism.
because some of you don't seem to make the logical link between what is happening now with the likes of Farage, UKIP and Britain first, and how Mussolini and Hitler came to power.




Using the success of fascist rule in Germany and Italy and the failings of fascist movements in other European states as an example, explain and discuss the approach of Robert Paxton in 'Five stages of Fascism.'

   The rise of Fascism in Europe during the inter war period (1918-1938) is a much contested area of research. Fascist movements appeared all across the European nations, in the obvious instance in Germany and Italy, but also in such countries as Britain, France, Hungary, Spain and Portugal. This period was rife with discontent at the state of economic affairs and saw a rise of support for the nation state. With similar conditions across Europe, why is it that the fascist movements in Italy and Germany were the only movements which managed to secure power? Many historians and theorists from the social sciences have offered various explanations to why these movements succeed where others had failed. These reasons often refer to the Great Depression and state of economic affairs, the rise of nationalistic feeling within nation states and the use of violence to name a few. There are problems with these explanations however, these conditions were apparent not only in Italy and Germany, but across all the nations involved in the Great War. They do not explain what made the fascist movements in Italy and Germany succeed and become Fascist ruled states. The problem, as Robert Paxton explains, is that Fascism is difficult to define. He states that "five major difficulties stand in the way of defining fascism.[1]" These are Timing; the fact that the fascist movements were misunderstood at the time that they appeared. Mimicry; the extent of regimes that have 'borrowed' so called fascist idea, but did not function in the same way. The difference of time and space; "They differ in space because each national variety of fascism draws its legitimacy...not from some universal scripture but from what it considers the most authentic element of its own community identity.....They differ in time because of the transformations and accommodations demanded of those movements that seek power."[2] The relationship between doctrine and action; essentially that there is no universal fascist doctrine, which a large portion of theorists and historians try to justify, but rather a belief in "the powers of the race, of the nation, of the community."[3] Finally, the terms incorrect overuse in modern society. Paxton suggests that the reason Fascist movements gained power in Italy and Germany was by no single influence, he argues that in both cases there were 5 very particular stages that were unique to Germany and Italy. These stages are the Initial creation of the movements; under what conditions they came about. The Rooting of the movements as Political parties; how they come into government. Acquisition of power; how they claim their rule. Exercise of power; essentially how they rule and under what political climate, and finally the evolution of fascists 'dual power'; radicalisation or entropy. By comparing the various fascist movements across Europe, and the conditions within these countries and  comparing them against these '5 stages of fascism,' focusing on the processes and discriminations among these stages it might be possible to discern a reason as to why Germany and Italy emerged as the only fascist regimes in this period.


      First we look to the initial creation of Fascist movements; Paxton's first stage of fascism. "Fascism can appear wherever democracy is sufficiently implanted to have aroused disillusion...in order to give birth to fascism, a society must have known political liberty - for better or for worse."[4] It is this disillusion under which fascism is born, primarily as nationalistic movements, and the qualities of which are inherently unique from country to country. All fascist movements start here. For example, Hungary's early Fascist movements formed after the treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye in 1919 which saw Hungary lose land to the newly created states such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia. "Against this background a number of patriotic societies sprang up, many of them secret. All aimed to reverse the verdict of the war and restore Hungary's past greatness."[5] In Britain the worsening of the economic situation and the disillusion with the moderate conservative minded governments at the time lead to the formation of the British Union of Fascists who aimed to "Convert the existing chaotic survival of laissez -faire liberalism into planned economy serving the needs of the State as a whole. The state envisaged would be authoritarian, and based on Mosley's (leader of the B.U.F) black shirts, who claimed to be essentially a national movement whose policy was contained in two words: 'Britain First."[6] Indeed these movements have similar beginnings to those in Germany and Italy. In Germany the collapse of the Kaisers Empire after the war and hyper inflation lead to a growing feeling of dissatisfaction with the Weimar government; when the 'Great Depression' hit in the late twenties it "knocked the last nail into the coffin of a disintegrating order...In this swarming mass of unemployed, the ruined "bourgeois" and "sometime-bourgeoisified proletarians" were united by a common helplessness and exasperation.."[7]
    As can clearly be seen, the various fascist movements all materialism under similar circumstances. This still does not answer why Fascist rule prevailed in Italy and Germany, but nowhere else. To begin to answer this we must examine these movements in contrast to Paxton's second stage of fascism. The rooting of Fascism in the political climate, "in which a fascist movement becomes a party capable of acting decisively on the political scene."[8] This transition happens relatively rarely in Fascist movements as there are precise conditions required for this to happen. Firstly there needs to be a severe weakness of the Liberal State. A government whose actions 'condemn the state.' Secondly there needs to be a political deadlock between those on the political 'right' that hold the power; the liberal bourgeois, and those that demand change on the 'left.' This polarisation just simply did not occur in some instances. Britain for example had a relatively moderate political climate. The formation of the B.U.F may have signified dissolution in part, however, unlike Germany and Italy, "the British middle class was not ruined, not in terror of social revolution, not harassed or excited enough to join [Mosley's (The B.U.F)] in sufficient numbers."[9] Due to this lack of polarisation some sections of the British middle class "saw fascism as the chief danger,"[10] and those that did sympathise its authoritarian ideas were "shocked by fascist hooliganism."[11] Another example would be France; during the agricultural strikes of 1936 and 1937 peasant anger was whipped up by the 'Green shirts' of the demagogue Henri Dorger├Ęs."[12] However, unlike the unstable governments of Germany and Italy; where civil unrest was put down by militants and vigilantes, France did not need the fascist 'Green shirts,' they had the French Gendarmerie, and as such "the authority of the state and the power of the conservative farmers' organizations left hardly any space in the French countryside for the rooting of a fascist parallel power."[13] On the other hand Both Italy and Germany's governments were weak, fearing revolt and powerless. This in essence is what leads the Fascist parties to power as the "break down of democratic regimes and the success of Fascist movements in assembling new, broad catch-all-parties that attract a mass following across classes and hence seem attractive allies to conservatives looking for ways to perpetuate their shaken rule."[14]


       This brings us to the third of Paxton's stages of Fascism; that of securing power. "At the third stage, the arrival in power, comparison acquires greater bite. What characteristics distinguished Germany and Italy, where fascism took power, from countries such as France and Britain, where fascist movements were highly visible but remained marginal?"[15] As previously stated, In France the liberal conservatives did not feel threatened from the left or the right, as is evident in their putting down of agricultural riots, and in Britain the conservative party succeeded in ruling effectively, and as such the Fascist's concerns were quashed. In Spain Fascism had seized power via force and thus ended up with a regime more akin to a military dictatorship. What then allowed fascism to take hold in Italy and Germany? A key aspect in both cases is that neither Hitler nor Mussolini took control of power by force, "each was invited to take office as head of government by a head of state in the legitimate exercise of his official functions, on the advice of his conservative counselors, under quite precise circumstances: a deadlock of constitutional government (produced in part by the polarization that the fascist abetted); conservative leaders who felt threatened by the loss of their capacity to keep the population under control at a moment of massive popular mobilization; an advancing left; and conservative leaders who refused to work with that left and who felt unable to govern against the left without further reinforcement."[16] Essentially this overview is what the other fascist movements lacked. It is this willingness of the conservatives to work with the fascists and the flexibility of the fascists themselves that allowed them a path to power. It is how the movements conduct themselves in stages 1 and 2 that affect the variable factor of the conservative's likelihood to work with the fascists.  In the case of Italy it was down to the problems Mussolini's Fascist presented to the government. "If the fascist coup was put down by the army, who would be left to defend society from a revival of 'bolshevism'?"[17] This fear of the left, in addition to the possibility of a civil war and wavering support from the army lead to appointment of Mussolini as prime minister.


     This leads us to the fourth stage of Fascism; how power is exercised, which is largely down to how power is secured. Only Germany and Italy's Fascist movements under Hitler and Mussolini managed to claim power 'legitimately'; most other instances such as the fascist movement's in Britain and France failed in their attempt to gain power. Those movements that did gain a foothold, such as Spain, did so by force, and such needed up being authoritarian in nature and thus lacking the 'authentic' fascist characteristics. Paxton states; "the tensions within fascist rule also help us clarify the frontiers between authentic fascism and other forms of dictatorial rule. Fascist rule is unlike the exercise of power in either authoritarianism (which lacks a single party, or gives it little power) or Stalinism (which lacked traditional elites)."[18] He goes on to spell out these differences in more detail, "Stalin's communist party governed a civil society radically simplified by the Bolshevik revolution: under Hitler, in contrast, the party, the bureaucracy, and the traditional elites jostled for power. Even if Stalin's techniques of rule often resembled those of Fascism. He did not concern himself with concentrations of inherited autonomous social and economic power."[19]

     The final stage of Fascism is how it evolves over the long term. The Italian Fascist regime under Mussolini transcended into routine authoritarianism for the large portion of the period. Whilst on the other hand Nazi Germany reached full radicalization, for which fascism is most famous for. For Germany it manifested after conquering Poland, and subsequently committing to racial cleansing. "Extreme radicalization remains latent in all Fascisms, but in circumstances of war, and particularly of victorious wars of conquest, give it the fullest means of expression."[20]

    

      Paxton's five stages of Fascism not only give us a clear idea of how to defineFascism, but also help us to understand why the Fascist movements such as Germany and Italy succeed in gaining power while the other movements failed. Through examining the various fascist movements and comparing them to these five stages it is possible to see a correlation between the circumstances in which these movements arrived and gained influence, and the reasons as to why some floundered, while other succeeded.  The main criticism to Paxton's five stages would be that while it does provide a comprehensive explanation to the various successes and failures of Fascism in this inter-war period, it does not explain the possibilities of Fascism in the present. While he acknowledges its possible the only theoretical framework we have to base fascism today against is that "fascism is a system of political authority and social order intended to reinforce the unity, energy and purity of communities in which liberal democracy stands accused of producing divisions and decline."[21] In a world where democracy 'stands accused' on a daily basis from all parties, this isn't much help.







Bibliography.



  • Paul Brooker., 'The Faces of Fraternalism: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan' (Oxford.) 1991
·         Ernest Gellner., 'Encounters with Nationalism'(Blackwell) 1994.



·         Roger Griffin., 'Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning Under Mussolini and Hitler (Palgrave Macmillan) 2007



·         Julian Jackson Ed., 'Short Oxford History of Europe - Europe 1900-1945' (Oxford. ) 2002



  • Robert Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism, in ' the Journal of Modern History, Vol. 70, No. 1. (March., University of Chicago) 1998



  • Mihaly Vajda., 'Fascism as Mass Movement' (London) 1976



·         Eugene Weber., 'Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century (Van Nostrand) 1964















[1] Robert Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism, in ' The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 70, No. 1. (Mar., 1998), pp 2.

[2] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism', pp 3-4.

[3] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism', pp 4-5

[4] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism',  pp 11.

[5] Eugene Weber., 'Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century (Van Nostrand., 1964) pp 88

[6] Weber., 'Varieties of Fascism' pp 110.

[7] Weber., 'Varieties of Fascism' pp 79.

[8] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism' pp 13.

[9] Weber., 'Varieties of Fascism' pp 112.

[10]Kevin Passmore., 'Politics,' in, 'Short Oxford History of Europe - Europe 1900-1945' (Oxford., 2002) pp108.

[11] Weber., 'Varieties of Fascism' pp 112.

[12] Richard Bessel., 'Society,' in, ''Short Oxford History of Europe - Europe 1900-1945' (Oxford., 2002) pp 129.

[13] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' pp 14.

[14] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' pp 14-15.

[15] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' pp 16.

[16] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' pp 17

[17] Paul Brooker., 'The Faces of Fraternalism: Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan' (Oxford., 1991) pp 40.

[18] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism' pp 18.

[19] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' pp 19.

[20] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' pp 20.


[21] Paxton., 'The Five Stages of Fascism,' pp 21.

Wednesday, 22 June 2016

80. REMAIN. EU closing statement.

I've argued this back and forth for what seems like a lifetime.

But this is my closing statement.

To all you right wing leave supporters.
 

Your idol Thatcher thought it was a good idea to remain in the EU in the 70's.
Now, my distaste for right wing policies are well known...

But this isn't about right vs left.

The EU was a good idea then, and it still is now.
All leave have ever done is use nonsensical statements with no empirical evidence to support their claims.
All they have is fudged numbers and blatant divisive propaganda.

And while the remain campaign is accused of fear and scaremongering (to which I can see why, but I'd argue is reasonable warnings), it is based, for the most part, on in depth research and the conclusions of international bodies, experts and politicians/ allied nations from around the world and here in the UK too.

Use logic.
Use reason.
Do actual research, in real books, with real data.
Stop believing the daily mail, the sun and sky news; the right wing racist, homophobic, xenophobic and elitist media.

People say this is an opinion, and everyone is free to choose.
That may be true.
But if your opinion ignores all reasonable, well founded and logical evidence, then you're an ignorant fool.
If you choice is based on false claims, selfishness or a choice that is prejudiced against nationality, religion and race, then you are morally bankrupt.

Some may claim that I don't shut up.
That a standpoint like that is overbearing, patronising...

I don't care.
Because if you refuse to listen to logic and reason,
refuse to listen to empirical evidence over propaganda,
refuse to be open and accepting of people and instead choose to be prejudice about the random chance of ones birth,
refuse to trust in peoples ability to collectively work together (hope) and instead trust in those who seek to divide us (hate),
then I don't want you our your poisonous ideology in my life.

People say this is an opinion, and everyone has a choice to make.
I don't believe you do.

I am for;
Logic, reason and evidence not lies and propaganda.
Unity not Division.
Peace not Conflict.
Hope not Hate.

I'm for the EU.